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Abstract: Enforcement of a high-level statement of security policy may be diflcult to discern 
when mapped through functional requirements to a myriad of possible security services and 
mechanisms in a highly complex, networked environment. A method of articulating network 
security functional requirements, and their fuljillment, is presented. Using this method, security in 
a quality of service framework is discussed in terms of “variant” security mechanisms and 
dynamic security policies. For illustration, it is shown how this method can be used to represent 
Quality of Security Service (QoSS) in a network scheduler beneJtfunction? 
1 Introduction 
Several efforts are underway to develop middleware systems that will logically combine net- 
work resources to construct a “virtual” computational system [4] [7] [S]  . These geographically 
distributed, heterogeneous resources are expected to be used to support a heterogeneous mix of 
applications. Collections of tasks with disparate computation requirements will need to be effi- 
ciently scheduled for remote execution. Large parallelized computations found in fields such as 
astrophysics [ 141 and meteorology will require allocation of perhaps hundreds of individual pro- 
cesses to underlying systems. Multimedia applications, such as voice and video will impose 
requirements for low jitter, minimal packet losses, and isochronal data rates. Adaptive applica- 
tions will need information about their environment so they can adjust to changing conditions. 
User acceptance of these virtual systems, for either commercial or military applications, will 
depend, in part, upon the security, adaptability, and user-responsiveness provided. Several of the 
projects engaged in building the middleware to create these networks are pursuing the integration 
of security [6] [lo] [22] and quality of service [ 11 [16] into these systems. The need for.virtual 
networked systems to both adapt to varying security conditions, and offer the user a range of secu- 
rity choices is apparent. 
In the network computing context, users or user programs may request the execution of “jobs,” 
which are scheduled by an underlying control program to execute on local or remote computing 
resources. The execution of the job may access or consume a variety of network resources, like: 
local I/O device bandwidth, internetwork bandwidth; local and remote CPU time; local, interme- 
diate (e.g., routing buffers) and remote storage. The resource usages may be temporary or persis- 
1. This work was funded through ’the DARPAATO Quorum program. 
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tent. As there are multiple users accessing the same resources, there are naturally various 
allotment, contention, and security issues regarding use of those resources. 
The body of rules for resolving network security issues is called the network security policy, 
whereas the body of rules for resolving network contention and allotment comprise a network 
management policy (which is sometimes taken to include the network security policy). These pol- 
icies consist of broad policy jurisdictions, such as scheduling, routing, access control, auditing, 
and authentication. Furthermore, these jurisdictions can be decomposed, typically, into functional 
requirements, such as, “users from network domain A must not access site B,” and “user C must 
receive a certain quality of service.” The network management and security policies, as mapped 
through the functional requirements, may be manifested in mechanisms throughout the network, 
including: host computer operating systems, network managers, traffic shapers, schedulers, rout- 
ers, switches and combinations thereof. As these mechanisms are distributed and are often 
obscurely related, there has been some interest in the ability to express and quantify the level of 
support for security policy and Quality of Security Service (QoSS: managing security and secu- 
rity requests as a responsive “service” for which quantitative measurement of service “efficiency” 
is possible) provided in networked systems. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a system for describing functional requirements for net- 
work security policies, to show how QoSS parameters and mechanisms can be represented in such 
a system,‘and to provide an example of the use of this system. The remainder of this paper is orga- 
nized as follows. Section 2 discusses a “security vector” for quantifying functional support of net- 
work security policy. Section 3 describes how the security vector can be used for expressing the 
effects of QoSS in a network-scheduling benefit function; and a conclusion follows in Section 4. 
2 Network Security Vector 
A network security policy can be viewed as an n-dimensional space of functional security 
. requirements. We represent this multidimensional space with a vector ( S )  of security components. 
Each component (S.c) specifies a boolean functional requirement, whereby the instantiation of a 
network job either meets (possibly trivially) or does not meet each of the requirements. By con- 
vention, a security vector’s components are ordered, so they can be referenced ordinally (S.3) or 
symbolically (S.c). A component may indicate positive requirements ( e g ,  communications via 
node n must use encryption) as well as negative constraints (e.g., users from subnet s may not use 
node n). Components can also be hierarchically grouped [21] . Requirements for a given security 
service may be represented by one or more components (indicating a service sub-vector), and a 
security service may utilize functions and requirements of other services and their components. 
Some jobs can produce output in differentfomzats, where a given format (e.g., high resolution 
video) might be more resource consumptive than another format (e.g., low resolution video). For- 
mats may have differing security requirements, even within the same job. For example, a video- 
stream format may require less packet authentication [ 181 , percentage-wise, than a series of fixed 
images based on the same data. A “quality of service” scheduling mechanism might choose one 
format for a job over another, depending on varying network conditions (e.g., traffic congestion). 
Further, adaptive applications may select formats depending upon changing conditions. For 
IPSec, security association (SA) processing using ISAKMP under IKE can permit complex secu- 
rity choices through an SA payload. For example, the payload recipient may be given transform 
choices regarding both Authentication Header and Encapsulating Security Protocol [ 131 . 
The set of all jobs is represented by J .  The set of all formats is represented by I .  The notation 
Sij identifies a vector containing the portions of S that are applicable to jobj  in format i ,  and SFc 
identifies a given component (c) of Sd. The relation of S to Sd is clarified further, below. The fol- 
lowing are some informal examples of security-vector components: 
S. 1 : user access to resource r = RW, based on table t 
. 
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S.2: % of packets authenticated >= 50, <= 90; inc 10 
S.3: level (user) = level(resource) 
S.4: length of confidentiality encryption key >= 64, <= 256; inc 64 
S.5: authentication header transform in { HMAC-MD5, HMAC-SHA} 
Here, “inc lo” indicates that the range from 50 through 90 is quantized into increments of 10, 
viz: 50,60,70,80,90. Later, we will need to indicate the number of quantized steps in the compo- 
nent; to do this, one more notational element is introduced, [Sc]. In the above examples, [XI] = 1,  
and [S.2]= 5. 
2.1 Variant Security Components 
When [S.c] > 1, the underlying control program has a range within which it may allow the job 
to execute with respect to the policy requirement. We refer to this type of policy, and component, 
as “variant.” Variant policies may be used within a resource management context, for example, to 
effect adaption to varying network conditions [17] . Also, if the policy mechanism is variant, the 
control program may offer QoSS choices to the user to indicate their preferences with respect to a 
given job or jobs. Without variant mechanisms, neither security adaptability by the underlying 
control program nor QoSS are possible, since fixed policy mechanisms do not allow for changes 
to security within a fixed joblresource environment. While the expression S.c may contain a com- 
pound boolean statement (see Section 2.2 ), by convention it may contain only one variant clause. 
2.2 Component Structure 
For use in the examples in this discussion, a component has the following composition (see 
Table 1 for details)’: 
component : := boolean expression, variant-range-specifier ; modifying-clause 
boolean -expression ::= boolean-statement [(or I and) boolean-statement] * 
boolean-statement : := LHS boolean-operator RHS 
Element Name Example S.l Example S.2 
Value 
Instantiated value 
Value of LHS 
Instantiated value of LHS 
Boolean operator 
user access to resource r = RW, 
based on table t 
false true 
user access to resource r 
W 70 
% of packets authenticated 
>= 50, <= 90; inc 10 
% of packets authenticated 
>= - 
Value of RHS 
variant range specifier 
1. It is not the focus here to elaborate on a policy representation language. See other efforts and works in 
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based on table t inc 10 
A given policy component has a value which is a boolean expression. This component may 
also have an instantiated value with respect to a specific job and format, which is either "true" or 
"false." A component has a left hand side (LHS), which is the item that is being tested; of course 
the LHS has a value as well as an instantiated value. A component also has a right hand side 
(RHS), which is what the LHS is tested against, as well as zero or more modifying clauses. Simi- 
larly to the LHS, the RHS may have a value (or values) which is dependent on the instantiation of 
the component. 
2.3 Dynamic Security Policies 
With a dynamic security policy, the value of a vector's components may depend on the network 
"mode" (e.g., normal, impacted, emergency, etc.), where M is the set of all modes. There is, con- 
ceptually, a separate vector for each operational mode, represented as: Smode. Access to a pre- 
defined set of alternate security policies allows their functional requirements and implementation 
mechanisms to be examined with respect to the overall policy prior to being fielded, rather than . 
depending on ad hoc methods, for example, during an emergency. 
Initially, every component of S has the same value in each of its modes. Ultimately, compo- 
nents may be assigned different values, depending on the network mode. For example: 
Snomd.b: user access to network node = granted; based on table t 
Simpacted.b: user access to network node = granted; based on table t, OR UID in set of adminis- 
Semergenq.b: UID in set of {administrators, policymakers} 
the case (i.e., the mode is unspecified) for the remainder of this discussion. 
2.4 Refinements to S' 
trators 
If a mode is not specified for a component (e.g., "S.a"), normal mode is assumed. This will be 
R is the set of resources { rl.. rn}.  RV is the subset of R utilized in executing jobj  in format i .  
Ti is the requested completion time of job j. 
Security policies may be expressed with respect to principals (user, group or role, etc.,), appli- 
cations, data sets (both destination and source), formats, etc., as well as resources in RF 
The definition of SV is finally refined as follows: Sii is a vector that is an order-preserving pro- 
jection of S, such that a component c from S is in Sii if and only if the value of c depends on for- 
mat i, jobj, or any r in RF The number of components in a security vector SV is [SQ]. 
2.5 Summary of Security Vector 
S is a general purpose notational system suitable for expressing arbitrarily complex sets of net- 
work security mechanisms. S can express variant policies, to allow security expressions of quality 
of service requests, and can have dynamic security elements to accommodate multiple situation- 
based policies. In particular, S can represent both (1) static security requirements that may be 
implemented in a system, as well as (2) the results of running a particular job or task against such 
static requirements. The latter usage will be examined in the next section, to express QoSS in an 
RMS benefit function. 
3 Network-Scheduler Benefit Function 
distributed network resources. One class of these mechanisms attempts to efficiently schedule the 
execution of multiple (possibly simultaneous) jobs on multiple distributed computers (e.g., the 
MSHN project [S] [22] [23] [ 111 [ 161 ), where each job requires a determinable subset of the 
resources. Of interest is a benefit function for comparing the effectiveness of such job scheduling 
As discussed above, various mechanisms exist for managing contention for, and allotment of 
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mechanisms when they are presented with real or hypothetical “data sets” of jobs. 
Jobs are assigned priorities for use in resolving resource contention and allocation issues. In 
some systems, a job’s priority may depend upon’the particular operating mode of the network [8]  
. Also, the different data formats of a multiple-format job may have different preferences (e.g., 
assigned by a user or “hard wired” as part of the application or job-scheduler database), and dif- 
ferent levels of resource usage [ 101 [ 121 . A network job scheduler should receive more credit in 
the benefit function for scheduling high priority and high preference jobs, as opposed to low prior- 
ity or low preference jobs. That is to say, a scheduler is intuitively doing a better job if important 
jobs, as judged by priority and preference, receive more attention than unimportant jobs. How 
much weight the priorities and preferences are given is a matter of network scheduling policy. 
We introduce a simple benefit function, By to measure how well a scheduler meets the goals of 
user preference and system priorities (see [4]  , [12] and [20] for other approaches). This function 
averages preference (p) and priority (P) (use of a priority and preference in measuring network 
effectiveness have been introduced for the MSHN project [ 101 ) . 
n m3 
C C Xjj (P0 + ~ 0 )  
B= j =  l i =  1 
2n 
Where the characteristic function X is defined for i, j as: 
Xij = 1 if format i was successfully delivered to job j  within time Ti, else 
and at most one format is completed per job: V j  E J C X u  I 1 
Jobs and formats are defined as above, and Pj is the priority of jobj, and 0 5 Pj 5 1 ,  
The formats for a job are assigned preferences (p) by the user, 0 <= p <= 1 : 
mi is the number of {format, preference} pairs assigned for j ob j  
pii is the preference the user has assigned to format i, job j  
the preferences for a job add up to 1: V j  E J : 
This approach assumes that users will assign preference values that correspond to resource 
usage, since we want the benefit function to indicate a higher value when the scheduler suc- 
ceeds in scheduling “harder” jobs [ 121 . 
3.1 Adding Security to the Benefit Function 
We wish the benefit function to reflect the effectiveness and restrictions of the security policy. 
First, we define the characteristic security function Z,  for i andj: 
Zii = 1 if the instantiated value of all components in Sii are true, else 0 
The numerator of the benefit function is multiplied by Z ,  so that no credit is given for jobs that 
I: 1 
mJ 
pi j  = 1 
i =  1 
fail to meet the security requirements: 
B= j = l i = l  
2n 
Now, for variant components, we wish to be able to give less credit to the scheduler for fulfill- 
ing less “difficult” security requirements. One algorithm for expressing this is for each instanti- 
ated component (c)  in Sii to be assigned a security completion token (8) where 0 I g 5 1 . g, will 
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indicate the completion token corresponding to component S.C. gc is defined to be the “percent- 
age” of [S.c] met or exceeded by the instantiated value of the component’s LHS (notated as s.~”): 
gc - S.C”/[S.C] 
To illustrate the calculation of g l ,  for component S.l: 
X I :  % of packets authenticated >= 50, <= 90; inc 10 
[XI] = 5 ( the number of quanta in X I ) ,  $.I” = 3 ( the job achieves the 3rd quantum (70)) 
For invariant components, g = 1 or g = 0. A token (8) whose value is 0 represents a job “fail- 
ing” the component’s security policy. Recall that 2 will be 0 when the job/format fails to meet the 
requirement of any security component, meaning that the function returns no benefit value for that 
job/format. We introduce a function (A) which averages the tokens of a job: 
Aii = (gI + g2 + .. + g,)/n 
where n = [Si] -- the number of components in SG, and (0 5 Aij  5 1) 
We weight the tokens (8) assigned to individual security components, whereby each g, has a 
g l =  3/5 = 0.6 
corresponding integer weight (w,), wc >= 0. So Aij becomes: 
AG = (glwl+ 8 2 ~ 2  + .. + g,w,)/(wr + ~2 + .. + w,) 
The component weighting factors allow the benefit function to give more weight to compo- 
In the final expression of the network benefit function, A is added to the numerator, providing 
nents that are “more important” than others, e.g., reflecting network management policies. 
an average of security, priority and preference. 
n mj 
X i j Z i j ( P j  + pij + Aij)  
.=  l i =  1 B= J 3n 
0 I B I 1 , where 1 indicates the maximum scheduling effectiveness. 
4 Discussion and Conclusion 
A security vector has been presented for describing functional requirements of network secu- 
rity policies. It has been shown that this vector can be used for representing security with respect 
to both quality of service and a network scheduler benefit function. 
We are involved in ongoing work to organize the vector into a “normal form” with sub-vectors 
or hierarchies corresponding to policy jurisdictions (such as: scheduling, routing, access control, 
auditing, and authentication) and to incorporate a costing methodology for security components, 
such as can be provided to a resource management system [9] . We are working to develop a 
means of adjusting the preference expression with a notion of the corresponding resource usage 
[12] . We are considering how to expand the security benefit function (A) to reflect user quality of 
security service choices within the range allowed by variant security components, and to reflect 
performance implications of redundant security mechanisms. 
The organizational security policy [ 191 governing the network may allow individuals or princi- 
pals representing them to override rules represented by invariant security vector components. For 
example, a military commander might decide to forgo cryptographic secrecy mechanisms for a 
job in an emergency (e.g., to improve network performance), even though the system has not been 
configured with “dynamic” or “variant” security mechanisms, as defined herein. From the per- 
spective of the security vector S and the benefit function, this is a change or violation of the com- 
puter security policy, which is not represented within the notation. It is recommended that this 
type of policy change be audited. 
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